Introduction
Will profits from the crimes of apartheid be examined in a court of law, and reparations paid to its victims? Might the case of apartheid be extended to slavery and colonialism? Is the US justice system capable of considering such radical notions of historical retribution?
Two hundred and nineteen years ago, one of the world's most pressing security problems was addressed through a US law that would subsequently haunt corporations sued by victims of repressive states and their corporate allies. In 1789, the US Congress passed the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in part to get a legal handle on shipping theft, and in the process to persuade colonial powers it was safe to trade with the US. "Torts" (personal injuries such as piracy theft) against foreigners ("aliens") could be served on the perpetrator within the US even if there was no other connection. ATCA, an obscure statue of just 33 words, only become widely known in the last two decades. More than 100 cases have been filed in US courts, beginning with a Paraguayan torture victim. It is one of several ways that the demand for reparations is being made, 1 but may be most powerful if the US courts agree in the coming months that black South Africans can use the law to win reparations of US$400 billion against several dozen multinational corporations which profited from apartheid.
In 1997, ATCA Holocaust Litigation cases against Swiss banks were settled out of court for US$1. 25 Not long after the activists' cases were filed, the South African government was requested by the Bush Administration to oppose Khulumani and other plaintiffs, and as noted below, agreed to do so after a period of relative neutrality. Due to the alliance between Pretoria and Washington (as well as the British and German governments) on behalf of multinational corporate interest, Judge John Sprizzo initially decided the case on behalf of corporate defendants in November 2004. He reasoned that ATCA conflicted with US foreign policy and South African domestic economic policy.
But three years later, on 12 October 2007, litigants won an appeal on the grounds that Sprizzo's logic was faulty. In May 2008, the US Supreme Court was expected to finally kill the lawsuit, on behalf of the corporations, but four of the justices discovered conflicts of interest in their own investment portfolios (they owned shares in the sued companies). The Supreme Court had no choice but to pass the case back to Sprizzo, who scheduled the next hearing for July 8 2008 . But the Supreme Court standdown, according to plaintiff lawyer Charles Abrahams, represented "a massive victory for the international human rights movement as a whole." 
Reparations, Social Responsibility and Public Relations
In contrast to Abrahams, establishment commentators worried that this new lease on the reparation lawsuit's life would blunt the possibility of generating a more nuanced foreign economic policy. Some point to Ronald Reagan's 1980s promotion of the Sullivan Principles to encourage multinational corporations to raise black worker wages. Others seek out of court settlements and corporate investments.
To illustrate, the conservative Washington representative of South Africa's International Marketing Council, Simon Barber, was dismissive of the litigants' Supreme Court win: "The endeavour remains quixotic, nonetheless. The only redistribution of wealth ever likely to result is from shareholders to lawyers. There has been plenty of that already." Still, he revealed a nervous twitch:
The US government has been as clear as the Similar cases would underscore how important it is to disincentivise profits made through operations within dictatorial regimes such as Burma or Zimbabwe is one objective. In mid-2008, just as Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union -Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) committed torture and murder to ensure his re-election, AngloPlats announced a US$400 million investment in lucrative Zimbabwean mines.
In opposition to sanctions and disinvestment from sites like apartheid South Africa, the phenomenon of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) grew in part to allow large firms like Anglo to claim they were undermining oppressive governments from within, and that the tax revenues and other benefits to a repressive regime were offset by the firms' empowerment of trade unions and introduction of market rationality. Such claims were never seriously addressed in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which gave large local corporations which profited from apartheid a twoday wrist-slapping exercise, although the TRC did recommend a wealth tax to redistribute apartheid profits. Hence, according to law professor Danny Bradlow of American University, who opposes the reparations strategy:
Regardless of their outcome, these legal bouts will result in embarrassing publicity about [multinational corporations'] role in apartheid SA. In addition, they know that these types of lawsuits will continue to hound them unless they can prove that they are behaving responsibly in difficult situations. Consequently, even if they win this case, they may still feel compelled to try and prove, both to SA and the world, that they are responsible global citizens, who accept an obligation to use their profit-making and philanthropic operations to help address social problems like poverty, inequality, unemployment and discrimination. Given these unpleasant scenarios and the urgent need to address the difficult legacy apartheid has left us, it behoves both Khulumani and the corporate defendants to think creatively about resolving their differences out of court.
An out of court multibillion dollar settlement was, indeed, the outcome of a prior ATCArelated victory by Holocaust victims' descendants, in their fight with Swiss and German corporations and banks. Partly because of race, but also because a win against apartheid might also generate renewed reparations interest in three other areas -environmental destruction, colonialism and slavery -it appears crucial for international business to end these lawsuits before they get a toehold in US jurisprudence. Reflecting this concern, Clinton-era US deputy treasury secretary Stuart Eizenstat, once a supporter of reparations claims against pro-Nazi corporations, provided "talking points" to the "USA Engage" lobby of 650 multinational corporations in November, 2002, to help capital fight the ATCA. For if South African reparations activists "can galvanise public opinion and generate political support," Eizenstat explained, "they may achieve some success despite legal infirmities." Was it immoral and unethical business behaviour? I believe so. 8 Khulumani lawyer Michael Hausfeld adds, " [w] e are contending that those companies were linked in ways to the South African government, such that they were aiders and abetters of crime. They assisted the apartheid government in furthering the commission of crimes against humanity." 9 Although the present South African government ruled by the African National Congress(ANC) agreed with this analysis prior to 1994, when they insisted that multinational corporations disinvest, in subsequent years they changed position entirely.
South African Offi cial Hostility
In 2001, the UN World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) was the site of the most vigorous debate about reparations to date. ThenNigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo endorsed reparations along with other African official delegates. One suggested clause, for example, was that the "US should take responsibility and pay reparations for the TransAtlantic Slave Trade." But then president Thabo Mbeki and foreign minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma refused to support reparations and called instead merely for more donor aid. "Nigeria has chosen to ditch SA and align itself with other African hardliners over the slavery issue," lamented a Business Day editorial. "The difficulties that SA has encountered in Durban trying to move the rest of the continent to a more moderate position in negotiations between Africa and Europe over an apology and reparations for slavery, highlight the gulf, and sometimes deceit, that underlies relations between this country and the rest of the continent... When will our real friends in Africa stand up and be counted?" 10 Thanks to Mbeki, reparations demands were absent from the final WCAR document, and moreover, also soon led to a rupture between the ANC government and civil society activists.
During 2002, the Burmese villagers who sued the oil firm Unocal for damages done while earning profits under a repressive regime began to frighten multinational corporations. As the National Association of Manufacturers argued in a letter to George W. Bush's main lawyer, "If the Department of State fails to intervene when private suits threaten to impose new liabilities on American companies arising from activity abroad by a foreign government, it risks allowing a further erosion of the President's exclusive prerogatives on foreign policy and his ability to develop relationships with foreign governments in ways that he determines will best advance US national interests."
11 Bush agreed and his attorney general, John Ashcroft, lobbied the courts in an amicus curai brief, hoping to weaken the ATCA. Although they failed, the question of whether foreign policy is damaged in such lawsuits was established as a reasonable consideration, one which doomed the first round of apartheid reparations cases.
Frustrated by the failure of the WCAR to advance their agenda, leaders of Jubilee South Africa, Khulumani and other faith-based activists turned to the US and Swiss courts. Mbeki first reacted to the court applications with "neither support nor condemnation." However, in April 2003 , in the wake of Archbishop Desmond Tutu's final TRC report which recommended a reparations payment by businesses which benefited from apartheid, Mbeki changed tack. Now, he said, it was "completely unacceptable that matters that are central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts which bear no responsibility for the well-being of our country, and the observance of the perspective contained in our constitution of the promotion of national reconciliation." He expressed "the desire to involve all South Africans, including corporate citizens, in a cooperative and voluntary partnership." But Mbeki failed to reflect upon numerous such attempts by the Reparations Task Force and Cape Town's Anglican Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane for some years prior to the lawsuits. 12 Then trade minister Alec Erwin heaped on scorn during an April 2003 parliamentary discussion, declaring that Pretoria was "opposed to, and contemptuous of the litigation." Any findings against companies "would not be honoured" within South Africa, and a wealth tax -as recommended by the TRC -would be "counterproductive." 13 A few weeks later, the director-general in Mbeki's office, former liberation theologian Frank Chikane, attacked the morals of those filing the reparations lawsuits: "I have seen [apartheid] victims being organised by interest groups who make them perpetual victims. They will never cease to be victims because they [interest groups] need victims to advance their cause. I think it is a dehumanising act." Chikane argued that lawsuits against banks and corporations would lead "businesses here to lose money and therefore to lose jobs." As for the TRC wealth tax, "[m]y view has always been that healing will happen only if the victimiser stands up and says, 'let us make it right'. It will not happen if the government says so." 14 In July 2003, Mbeki and then justice minister Penuell Maduna went to even greater lengths to defend apartheid-era profits, arguing in a ninepage brief to a US court hearing a reparations case, that by "permitting the litigation", the New York judge would discourage "much-needed foreign investment and delay the achievement of the government's goals. Indeed, the litigation could have a destabilising effect on the South African economy as investment is not only a driver of growth, but also of unemployment." 15 As a friend of the court on behalf of the claimants (alongside Tutu), Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz replied that the comments by Mbeki and Maduna had "no basis," because, "those who helped support that system, and who contributed to human rights abuses, should be held accountable... If anything, it would contribute to South Africa's growth and development."
16 But by August 2003, even Nelson Mandela decided that the activist pressure on the foundations of global capitalism, namely, corporations' right to make profits no matter how egregious the regime, was out of control. Hosted by Africa's richest man, Nicky Oppenheimer, at the Rhodes Building in Cape Town, Mandela gave his name to a new foundation, "Mandela Rhodes," and used the occasion to attack the apartheid reparations lawsuits as "outside interference." 17 Maduna's letter to the US court requested that the lawsuits be dismissed, "in deference to the sovereign rights of foreign countries to legislate, adjudicate and otherwise resolve domestic issues without outside interference." But in August 2003, at the opening plenary of a major Reparations Conference, Jubilee SA's Berend Schuitema reported that Maduna made an extraordinary confession: "The reason why he had made the objection was that he was asked for an opinion on the lawsuit by Colin Powell. He gave Powell his written response, whereupon Powell said that he should lodge this submission to the Judge of the New York Court. Jubilee SA chairperson M.P. Giyose pointed out the bankruptcy of the sovereignty argument." 18 In June 2004, the US Supreme Court handed down a surprising defeat for the Bush regime in the case of Sosa v Alverez, when corporate plaintiffs requested that foreigners not be permitted to file lawsuits for human rights violations committed elsewhere in the world under the Alien Tort Claims Act (cases were then pending against companies for repressive operations in Burma, Nigeria, Indonesia and apartheid South Africa). 19 According to the corporations, US courts might infringe upon the sovereignty of nations and interfere with the business of free trade. However, the judgement was mixed. On the one hand, the conservative Supreme Court's ruling was a "huge blow" to the firms, according to Khulumani and Jubilee South Africa lawyers. On the other hand:
The US Supreme Court cautioned that the right In reality, the final report of the TRC, chaired by Tutu, contained a different sentiment, namely that the New York reparations cases posed no conflict with South Africa law or policy: "Business failed in the hearings to take responsibility for its involvement in state security initiatives specifically designed to sustain Apartheid rule." According to Jubilee, the TRC also found that:
It is also possible to argue that banks that gave financial support to the Apartheid state were accomplices to a criminal government that consistently violated international law. The recognition and finding by the international community that Apartheid was a crime against humanity has important consequences for the victims of Apartheid. Their right to reparation is acknowledged and can be enforced in terms of international law. 21 Taking the most conservative approach possible, Judge John Sprizzo of the Southern District of New York dismissed the apartheidrelated lawsuits in November 2004 on grounds that aiding and abetting claims could not be brought to bear under the Alien Tort Statute. The judge ruled that Pretoria "had indicated it did not support the lawsuits and that letting them proceed might injure the government's ability to handle domestic matters and discourage investment in its economy." 22 Within a few months, the adverse implications of Maduna's intervention for international justice became even more ominous, in a case involving women who were victims of Japanese atrocities during World War II. Fifteen "comfort women" from Korea, China, the Philippines and Taiwan sued the Japanese government in the US, using the Alien Tort Claims Act. They had been held as sex slaves, raped and tortured by the Japanese military. In June 2005, the US Court of Appeals in the District of Colombia rejected their suit in part by citing Maduna's affidavit.
Meanwhile at home, the South African government was unilaterally paying just R30 000 to 19 000 families whose members suffered murder or torture, far less than the TRC had recommended. Khulumani Support Group strategist Roy Jobson complained: The Washington-based Mobilization for Global Justice and a coalition of Swiss activists (Comtec, Declaration de Berne, and Campagne pour l'Annulation des Dettes et pour les Réparations en Afrique Australe) joined Jubilee protesters in solidarity demonstrations. From Sandton to Washington, Citibank was target, for as the UNs Special Committee against Apartheid had observed in 1979, "Citigroup has loaned nearly 1/5 of the US$5 billion plus which has gone to bolster apartheid" and in subsequent years made yet more loans for segregated housing and for the rollover of apartheid debt during the 1985 financial crisis. In Berne, Credit Suisse and UBS were the subject of protest because from the early 1980s they replaced US and British banks as the main apartheid financiers.
Disunity Amongst the Plaintiffs
But during this time, there were also important problems that deserve to be mentioned. The South African government's arrogance in dismissing and then sabotaging the reparations campaigning can partly be explained by disunity amongst campaigners. There are three major splits worth recording, as they diverted the reparations drive and made it far more difficult to achieve the mass public support Eizenstat warned might emerge. The most important split involved different plaintiffs who lined up either with or against a high-profile "cowboy lawyer," Edward F. Fagan. Fagan had promoted the Holocaust case, but was accused of being "a destructive opportunist" and "carpetbagger" by South African Dumiso Ntsebeza. According to labour journalist Terry Bell: "He has tarnished and complicated cases that have great merit," says Ntsebeza. But while Fagan is now uncharacteristically silent and out of sight, the apartheid claims cases have been damaged and a division, a legacy of Fagan's intervention, remains between two major claims. 25 Even without Fagan, enough conflict existed between plaintiffs to adversely affect the broader reparations agenda, and it is only in 2008 that the various groups have found it necessary and feasible to come together against their corporate and state opponents. Between the Khulumani Support Group and Jubilee, severe tensions arose over claims to ownership of the case and over direction of strategy. A dispute erupted between Jubilee's former Johannesburg staff and board members and several provincial chapters; and destroyed the organisation from early 2006 until its revival in August 2008.
Linking Broad-based Reparations Issues
The story is not only of division, but of unity as well. Jubilee has also done an exceptional job of linking issues so that its apartheid debt campaign launched in 1998 soon connected dots © Africa Institute of South Africa How easy will it be to link the issues, given how much resistance there was from Thabo Mbeki's government to the core campaign? Part of the reason for Mbeki's truncated term of office was his perceived pro-corporate orientation, which alienated so many constituents. Regardless of the stance taken by Kgalema Motlanthe, Jubilee strategists believe they can appeal to a much richer strand of African nationalism, than one that relies simply upon an appeal to sovereignty. For as Gerald Lenoir and William Minter recall:
In 1993, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) spelled out Africa's case for reparations.
The Abuja Proclamation declares that the injury caused by slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism "is not a thing of the past, but is painfully manifest in the damaged lives of contemporary Africans from Harlem to Harare, in the damaged economies of the black world from Guinea to Guyana, from Somalia to Surinam."
The proclamation states that a moral debt is owed to African peoples and calls for "full monetary payment through capital transfer and debt cancellation." 27 Indeed, there is growing pressure for corporations to make monetary payment to their victims in cases of extreme ecological damage. In June 2008, a network called the African Civil Society Organisations Coalition addressed the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment in Johannesburg, demanding that northern states and corporations provide resources for affordable renewable energy, prevent bio fuel threats to food security in Africa, and compensate Africa for an estimated US$50 billion required to adapt to climate change damage caused nearly entirely by industrialised countries' historic accumulation of capital. 28 More generally, public support appears to be growing for Third World environmental reparations. The "ecological debt" that the North owes the South, for example, is invoked by Ecuadoran president Rafael Correa, in part for his initiative to "keep the oil in the soil" to help preserve the Yasuni National Park and slow climate change. But US$5 billion in ecological debt repayment by the North to Ecuador would be a reasonable offset for Ecuador's revenue losses, he argues.
In Nigeria, demands by the Ogoni people relate not only to the massive destruction of their Delta habitat, but also to the looting of their natural wealth by Big Oil. According to Sam Olukoya, So, another operator acceptable to the Ogonis will take over." 30 MOSOP held a victory march in Port Harcourt, and its information officer, Bari-ara Kpalap, thanked Yar'Adua, but nevertheless promised more agitation in the Niger Delta "until the government took more practical and sincere steps to genuinely address the problems of the area."
From South Africa, the demand for reparations from apartheid's financiers is a crucial precedent for wider campaigns aimed at reversing the outflow of resources from Africa and correcting historic wrongs, as well as addressing contemporary crisis conditions. As Giyose remarks:
The work on ecological debt is persistently rais- 
Conclusion
How far might the reparations movement travel? Another nervous twitch can be discerned from those fearing that the revival of apartheid reparations claims could boomerang to the US where slavery-related profits became more visible in recent years. Representative John Conyers, who chairs the House Judiciary Committee, is, according to a reliable source, "reportedly waiting for Obama to be elected so Conyers can rush a reparations law through Congress." 32 But rather than depend upon courts and members of congress, the most important ingredient is a well-functioning, militant civil society. A variety of organisations emerged during the 2000s to fight for reparations in the broadest sense, linking back to slavery, colonialism, apartheid and environment destruction, including not just the South Africans and the Jubilee South Africa movement, but the Reparations Movement (for Africa and the African Diaspora); Africa Reparations Movement; All for Reparations and Emancipation; Reparations Central; Caucasians United for Reparations and Emancipation; National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America; New World Reparations; and Sons of Afrika. The challenge is to take a diverse civil society and find those intersections in national law and through national states which will permit the issue of reparations to not only be raised with some prospect for success, but to keep the linkages growing, as Giyose indicates, so that the struggle becomes a broader and wider critique of economic injustice at its roots. 
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